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The Damned Dolls
Bruce L. Hay
Abstract, This article reads the Brown v. Board of Education case against
the backdrop of the absurdist theater of the 1950s, a genre that ﬂourished
both in the art world and in the highly staged experiments of academic social
psychology. I consider the case's resonances with the contemporaneous pro-
ductions of Asch's conformity experiments and Beckett'sWaiting for Godot.
Keywords, Constitutional law,
Warren court, inequality, confor-
mity, social psychology, theater
Jesus Christ, those damned dolls! I thought it was a joke.
NAACP lawyer William Coleman1
The decision in Brown v. Board of Education arrived a little behind schedule, a year
after Samuel Beckett’s En attendant Godot had its world premiere in Paris.2 Argued
in the fall of 1952, the case ordinarily would have been decided by the spring of
1953. But the decision, like the play, was beset by production delays, owing to its
novelty and controversial nature. The justices were divided, and at Felix Frank-
furter’s request, the case was held over for another round of argument the following
term. That September, Chief Justice Vinson died suddenly, just before the second
round of arguments. Frankfurter, appalled by Vinson’s lack of leadership in the
case, reportedly called his unexpected departure “the first indication I have ever
had that there is a God.”3 Earl Warren was appointed to replace Vinson, and with
his prodding, the justices eventually reached agreement; Warren’s unanimous opin-
ion for the court was handed down on May 19, 1954.4 And so Brown appeared a year
after Godot, which seems sadly fitting: everyone was kept waiting a little longer.
While the court was deciding what, in retrospect, has come to seem a rather ele-
mentary legal question about equality, social psychologist Solomon Asch of Swarth-
more College was conducting his famous conformity experiments. A group of
individuals  whose size, interestingly, was often nine5  would be asked to judge
the relative length of adjacent line segments displayed in the front of the room.
Everyone would say, with a straight face, that two lines of manifestly unequal
length were in fact of the same length. The subject of the experiments, puzzled at
Law & Literature, vol. 26, issue 3, pp. 321342. issn 1535-685X, electronic issn 1541-2601.
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what the others were saying, would nonetheless go along with them  never realiz-
ing that they were the experimenter’s confederates, acting according to a script
they had been coached on before the subject arrived. Over the course of twelve tri-
als, many subjects would agree with the (incorrect) group answer eight, ten, or even
twelve times. Quite aside from their scientific merit, these experiments are a
remarkable piece of stagecraft: with the starkness of a Beckett play, they seem to
capture the absurd essence of a world in which a sequestered group of nine men
could  not just once, but a dozen times  have declared “equal” things that, as
plain as the eye can see, are not.
The three works went on the road, so to speak, in 1955. The court’s follow-up
opinion concerning implementation of Brown (“all deliberate speed”) was issued
in May of that year; Godot, translated into English, opened in London in August,
soon to open in America; and Asch’s results appeared for the general reader in
Scientific American in November.6 Audience reactions to all three were mixed at
first, although they eventually became canonical in their respective domains.
Godot inspired excitement, outrage, and bewilderment among both professional
critics and popular audiences. Its American premiere in Miami in January 1956
was a flop, but the Broadway production later that year ran for a respectable
ten weeks, and within a few years the play had been translated into twenty
languages and seen by 1 million spectators. The conformity experiments were
hugely influential among social psychologists, but many observers thought them
too contrived and artificial to say anything about the real world, while others
wondered about the ethics of deceiving and manipulating subjects as the experi-
ments had done. As for Brown, there is no need to recount the critical and popu-
lar debates it aroused, or to describe its cool reception at venues such as Little
Rock Central High in 1957.7
A Tragicomedy in Two Acts, Beckett called the English version of his play,8
apparently referring to the “mungrell Tragy-comedie” that Sir Philip Sidney once
saw in the work of Elizabethan playwrights, work that had ignored the formal
requirements of classical tragedy and lacked its decorum and solemnity.
But besides these grosse absurdities, how all theyr Playes be nei-
ther right Tragedies, nor right Comedies: mingling Kings &
Clownes, not because the matter so carrieth it: but thrust in clownes
by head and shoulders, to play a part in majesticall matters, with
neither decencie, nor discretion. So as neither the admiration &
commiseration, nor the right sportfulness, is by their mungrell
Tragy-comedie obtained.9
As Beckett evidently discerned, these words aptly describe his own strenuous
refusal to conform to the requirements of genre, letting “clownes” take over
“majesticall matters” with utter contempt for representational conventions or
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audience expectations. And so with Brown, whose author presided over a body that
would become famous for disregarding, “with neither decencie nor discretion,” the
conventions and expectations associated with constitutional law. “Majesticall” as its
matter is, Brown is a drama tinged with absurdity that, I will argue in this essay,
has its counterparts in the sort of “Tragy-comedie” being developed in the stage the-
ater and also the experimental psychology of the period. The proceedings in Brown
“put meaning on trial,” to borrow Adorno’s telling description of absurdist drama,
and I suggest we can better understand them by looking at the parallel proceedings
occurring in Asch’s lab and on Beckett’s stage.
I make two general claims in the essay. One, as I have already suggested, is that
Godot and the conformity studies form a sort of interpretive frame for understand-
ing the Brown litigation, by which I mean not only the decision itself but the history
leading up to it and also its long aftermath. Though I have no reason to suppose this
was their intention, it is almost as if Asch and Beckett set out to create an allegory
of the case. I can scarcely imagine a better metaphor for the legal system’s adher-
ence to the fraudulent “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson10 than
the “shorter but equal” doctrine on display in the conformity experiments. I can also
scarcely imagine a better metaphor for the court’s difficulties in rendering a deci-
sion than the story of the hapless Vladimir and Estragon, unable to make a move,
unsure whether to side with the landowner or the slave. These correspondences
should not be entirely surprising: part of the reason Asch and Beckett’s works
remain so well known is that they seem to capture so effectively the psychic and
political landscape of the postwar world, as well as the more general dynamics by
which individuals are blinded or paralyzed in the face of injustice. (American racial
segregation is only one of many historical injustices that might be viewed through
the lens of these works.) Still, it is worth remarking on how effectively they seem to
capture the essence of the litigation.
My second claim concerns Warren’s opinion in the case, notorious for its terse-
ness and its reliance on social psychology research rather than on conventional
legal authorities. I suggest we look at the opinion in terms of the spare, bleak aes-
thetic of Asch and Beckett’s work, which share with Warren’s opinion the overarch-
ing sense that language is more or less dead. Brown’s refusal to speak the language
of constitutional law, a language discredited by its complicity in legalized segrega-
tion, finds its echo in the tendency toward silence in Godot and the conformity
experiments, both of which are centrally about the evacuation of meaning and the
corruption of speech. That is also how I view the most controversial element of the
Brown opinion: its reliance on Kenneth and Mamie Clark’s experimental studies of
segregation’s effects on schoolchildren, in which black pupils reject dark-skinned
dolls in favor of white-skinned ones. Critics have endlessly debated whether the
court was right to give “social science” such a prominent place in the opinion.
Without denying the importance of these debates, I propose to think of the Clark
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studies in theatrical rather than scientific terms, as a dramatic work, embedded
within the larger performance that constitutes Brown.
My purpose here is interpretive, not evaluative; I want not to judge the Brown
court, but rather to understand it in terms of cultural currents that, while familiar
to most readers, have not previously been brought to bear on the interpretation of
the case. The essay is meant as a contribution to what might be called the cultural
poetics of law, whose working hypothesis is that legal decisions are part of a com-
plex representational network in which the lines separating legal, artistic, scien-
tific, and other forms of cultural production are porous and unstable.11 Part I sets
the stage, introducing absurdist theater as a sort of aesthetic paradigm and looking
at some of the continuities between Godot and the conformity experiments. Part II
looks at the history leading up to Brown against the backdrop of Asch and Beckett’s
work. Part III looks at the aesthetic of the Brown opinion, with special attention to
the “damned dolls.” Part IV focuses on the period since the Brown, discussing ways
in which Asch and Beckett illuminate the events that came after the decision and
its contemporary place in American jurisprudence.
I
Let me start by remarking on the flourishing of tragicomic theater during the War-
ren Court years, which takes place in the psychology laboratory as well as on the
stage. It seems to me that the era’s experimental psychology scarcely differs from its
experimental theater, either in the formal devices employed  nonsensical situations,
pointless actions, bored or confused individuals confined to small spaces, and so on 
or in the bleak picture of humanity and of social institutions that emerges. Think of
Festinger’s cognitive dissonance experiments, in which subjects, having told someone
else they enjoyed an hour spent twisting knobs on a board and emptying and refilling
a tray of spools, conclude they must really have enjoyed it;12 Sherif’s “Robbers Cave”
group conflict experiments, in which subjects divided into arbitrary groups quickly
become bitter enemies13 Darley and Latane’s bystander apathy experiments, in
which subjects ignore a woman’s screams, or ignore smoke pouring in from the ceil-
ing, because that is what others in the room are doing;14 and of course Milgram’s obe-
dience experiments, in which the subjects administer electric shocks to an individual
who is trying to learn random pairings of words.15 Whatever else these works may
be, they are performances, with the same alternately farcical and terrifying quality
that characterizes plays like Ionesco’s Rhinoceros, Pinter’s The Birthday Party,
Genet’s The Balcony, Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, and other contribu-
tions to the absurdist theater of the 1950s and 1960s.
The psychologists, it has since become clear, were quite aware of the dramatur-
gical dimension of their work.16 What has not been sufficiently appreciated, I think,
is the similarity that their “genre” of production bears to the genre of absurdist
drama that we see emerging at roughly the same time in the 1950s. Both are
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animated by the same general idea: conventional naturalistic representations of
human behavior must go. For the playwrights, this means no longer observing the
usual requirements of coherent plot, dialogue, scenery, characterization, and other
elements of what Beckett called the “grotesque fallacy of realistic art,”17 elements
that are now to be replaced with barren landscapes, nonsensical language, mallea-
ble identities, and barely intelligible events such as dominate the modern world.
For the psychologists, it means no longer observing people in the outside world,
shifting instead to carefully constructed settings in which the researcher can
manipulate different features of the situation and remove extraneous influences. To
get the subjects to “act naturally” in the artificial setting, the researcher uses the
full apparatus of the theater  scripts and sets, props and costumes, amateur and
professional actors, endless rehearsals before the subjects arrived  to conceal from
them the existence of the experiment, or to mislead them about its true purpose.
The resulting images are practically indistinguishable from those produced by the
playwrights: nondescript individuals trapped in bewildering environments; behav-
ior governed by situational forces that the agent does not begin to comprehend; lan-
guage reduced to meaningless babble; cultural mores and social institutions
exposed as pious frauds.
The line between theater and reality is continuously blurred in these genres,
which is partly what accounts for their absurd quality. It is not only that the protag-
onists  or the subjects  are unwittingly surrounded by actors and props, all
according to a script they know nothing about. It is also that they become part of
the performance, conforming their thoughts and actions to the role that has been
created for them, however crazy it may be. They become the characters the scene
requires  oblivious sheep in the bystander experiments, vicious guards in the
prison study, and so on  unhampered by any beliefs, loyalties, or even identities
apart from those foisted upon them by the situation. This is also a central motif in
the drama of the period, for example in the role-playing games in Albee, where the
guests play “guests” and the hosts play “hosts,” or in the empty, cliche-ridden dia-
logue of Pinter and Ionesco, whose characters, unable to think or speak for them-
selves, are at the mercy of whatever words pop into, or are put into, their heads. In
the cognitive dissonance studies, the subjects are given some lines to recite about
how interesting it is to twist knobs and arrange spools in a tray for an hour; then,
having recited them, they decide the lines must be true. The episode might have
been lifted straight from The Bald Soprano, in which the husband and wife deduce
they must be a couple, because they live in the same house on the same street and
sleep in the same bed.
Academic psychologists were not alone in producing images so close in spirit to the
tragicomedies of the period. Other students of human behavior followed similar paths,
out of a shared sense that the representational conventions of their respective disci-
plines were largely bogus. Sociologist Erving Goffman, dropping the rationa-
listfunctionalist approach that dominated the field, developed a dramaturgical
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model in which social interactions are stage performances governed by multiple, con-
flicting sets, roles, and scripts of which agents are scarcely aware. Existentialist phi-
losophers made frequent use of theatrical metaphors in speaking of the mindless
automaticity with which most people live their lives, as though acting out stage direc-
tions written by others. Hannah Arendt’s study of Eichmann and the Holocaust  the
historical occurrence that forms the subtext of much of the work I am describing ren-
dered the defendant, who had cheerfully overseen the murder of 5 million people, in
terms that made him out to be equally villain and buffoon, his actions unaccompanied
by original thoughts of any kind. Evil, according to her controversial thesis, wore the
face not of a diabolical monster, but of an essentially vapid, almost vaudevillian figure
whose cliche-ridden speech resembled a badly memorized script.18 Many differences
separate these works, but they touch the same nerve as the absurdist theater of the
period, and develop some of the same representational strategies. It is probably no
coincidence that the experimental psychologists, grappling with similar problems,
should have done so as well. Nor is it a surprise to find that when they turned to writ-
ing plays, the results have deep correspondences with those produced by the (other)
experimental playwrights of the period.
Many such correspondences might be pursued, but the ones that will interest
here are those betweenGodot and the conformity studies, whose visions of the world
are almost seamlessly connected. The lone tree comprising Beckett’s landscape is
complemented by the four simple lines comprising Asch’s, figuring a world reduced
to the most elemental conditions, in which even the simplest propositions are in
doubt. There are no signposts of meaning anywhere, no authority figures around to
guide thought and action, and everyone seems to have taken leave of his senses.
Nothing much happens, beyond the lines changing length, the tree sprouting
leaves, and the protagonists in both works settling in to a routine of thoughtless
habit, endlessly repeated. (“Nothing happens, twice,” Vivian Mercer observed of
Godot’s two repetitious acts19. Of all the terrors in this world, the prospect of being
alone, of acting independently, is most unbearable; Vladimir and Estragon say they
should part but cannot, and even Lucky, Pozzo’s servant, seems reluctant to leave
the master who whips him, addresses him as “Pig,” and drags him around with a
rope around his neck. And yet there is nonetheless a countervailing desire for indi-
vidual integrity, a sense that dependence on others is a guilty pleasure. Speaking in
interviews after the last trial  but before being told what was really being tested,
and that the other subjects were confederates of the experimenter  many compli-
ant Asch subjects nonetheless speak of the importance of independent thought, and
some criticize the others for being overly conformist, as in this snippet from a sub-
ject who conformed eight times out of twelve:
Q. How did you feel when you continued to give answers different
from the others?
A. Doesn’t bother me. Would just as soon disagree, usually do.
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Q. Would you say you were disturbed about the disagreements?
A. Not a bit. Took it rather easily. [. . .]
Q. How do you explain [the answers of the others]?
A. Sometimes I felt they all were going along with the first guy who
answered. Not much strength of mind.
Q. What did you think about the other people in the group when
they all gave an answer that looked wrong to you?
A. Most people are sheep anyhow.20
That slightly deluded stance is a frequent theme of Beckett’s, as in the colloquy
about the two thieves.21
VLADIMIR: Ah yes, the two thieves. Do you remember the story?
ESTRAGON: No.
VLADIMIR: Shall I tell it to you?
ESTRAGON: No.
VLADIMIR: It’ll pass the time. (Pause.) Two thieves, crucified at the
same time as our Saviour. One 
ESTRAGON: Our what?
VLADIMIR: Our saviour. Two thieves. One is supposed to have
been saved and the other [. . .] (he searches for the contrary of saved)
[. . .] damned.
ESTRAGON: Saved from what?
VLADIMIR: Hell.
ESTRAGON: I’m going.
He does not move.
VLADIMIR: And yet [. . .] (pause) [. . .] how is it  this is not boring
you I hope  how is it that of the four Evangelists only one speaks of
a thief being saved. The four of them were there  or thereabouts 
and only one speaks of a thief being saved. [. . .]
ESTRAGON: Well? They don’t agree and that’s all there is to it.
VLADIMIR: But all four were there. And only one speaks of a thief
being saved. Why believe him rather than the others?
ESTRAGON: Who believes him?
VLADIMIR: Everybody. It’s the only version they know.
ESTRAGON: People are bloody ignorant apes.
The irony here is multilayered: the thief in question was a nonconformist, as was
the evangelist who singled him out, yet the masses unthinkingly flock to his story
because everyone else does.22 Estragon, making fun of their mindless conformity,
does not realize he is referring to himself. He has already revealed his ignorance; in
327
HAY  THE DAMNED DOLLS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [H
arv
ard
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
7:0
9 2
4 M
ay
 20
15
 
a few moments he will be bloodied from a kick to the shins. And so with the Asch
subject above, making fun of people for being sheep.
Alongside the humor, there is a genuinely moving quality to the Asch subject
interviews, with frequent references to loneliness, self-doubt, damned if you do, and
damned if you don’t. Confronted by the interviewer with the fact that they gave the
same (wrong) answers as the group, the Asch subjects who conformed seldom say
they thought these were actually the correct answers. What they tend to say,
instead, is that the group’s behavior caused them to doubt the accuracy of their own
judgments, while at the same time making them worry about being seen by the
others as weird (or communist, this being the 1950s). Several defend their actions
by invoking their version of the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”: if in doubt, go
with the majority, though you do not necessarily agree with them.
After all, the majority rules, so I guess I was wrong.23
Who am I to disagree with everyone? [. . .] If there’s an equal balance
between two alternatives, I think it natural and right to permit the
majority to influence your answer.24
When you’re in a crowd, who’s supposed to know?25
More sinister references creep in, alongside the appeals to majority rule. Some sub-
jects speak of mob psychology having taken over the room, though the confederates
exerted no overt pressure on anyone.26 One subject recalls his own experience as
bystander to a lynching.
At the conclusion, in the course of a general conversation, he
expressed the view that the duty of a government is to do the will of
the majority, even if you are convinced they are wrong. Suppose it
concerned a lynching? I wouldn’t want to stand in the way, I’ve seen
one. It’s like a tide  they’d trample me over  I was run over.27
Figure 1. The Asch Experiments. Subject is Third From Right.
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This is Asch’s only allusion to racial questions, with the possible exception of his
remark that the experiments expose the willingness of reasonable, good-willed
people “to call white black.”28 As the passage just quoted suggests, however, it is
hard not to detect the subject lurking between the lines of his study, just as it is
hard not to associate the subject with Beckett’s play. Godot is set in Europe,29 but
other places also come to mind when we hear the crack of the whip, see the rope
around the neck of the one addressed as “slave,” and hear references to hanging
people from the tree.
II
In his celebrated 1960 defense of the Brown decision, Charles Black suggested
that to the question presented in the case  does racial segregation violate equal
protection?  the correct answer was laughter.30 By this he meant not, of course,
that the case was funny, but rather that it was absurd. A southerner who had
grown up supporting segregation before having a change of heart, Black well
understood the suffering Jim Crow caused its victims. But he also insisted in his
article on its farcical character, the ridiculous pantomimes and double talk
deployed to hide its grim realities, its utter debasement of language. (He notes the
practice in many towns of giving the name “Lincoln High” to the Negro school.)
“How long must we keep a straight face,” he asked, when “we are solemnly told
that segregation is not intended to harm the segregated race, or to stamp it with
the mark of inferiority.” Though too polite to say so directly, he strongly implies in
his article that the language of constitutional law, which was having such a hard
time assimilating the Brown decision into its conceptual apparatus, has also been
corrupted. If it is capable of posing the question in the case seriously, if it is able to
ask whether the system of segregation squares with the idea of equal protection,
then there is nothing to be said in reply. Words have been drained of meaning,
and nothing remains for an honest person except the vocabulary of laughter and
tears. But not tears, Black seems to say, for those belong to tragedy. What we
have here should not be dignified with that term: there are too many low human
qualities in evidence, too much clowning and obscene wordplay, to call it tragedy.
This is Tragy-comedie.
Looking back at Brown, it is hard not to see the absurd quality of the case that
finally forced the court to reconsider the doctrine of “separate but equal.” The story
has been ably told many times,31 making it unnecessary to do more than recap the
highlights here: the court announces the doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, and
over the next five decades applies and elaborates it in not quite a dozen cases, of
which six involve education.32 In the later cases, the product of the NAACP’s care-
fully mapped strategy, the court adheres to the doctrine but weakens it, striking
down several segregated graduate school programs on the grounds that the facili-
ties for black students are inferior to the regular ones. In Brown, the court turns to
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the question of segregation in primary and secondary schools. After oral argument
in December 1952, the justices are sharply divided: Black, Douglas, Minton, and
Burton are for holding school segregation unconstitutional; Vinson and Reed are
against; Jackson and Clark are unsure but leaning against; Frankfurter, who hates
segregation but believes in judicial restraint, is deeply conflicted.33 Vinson dies and
is replaced by Warren, who has no judicial experience but quickly impresses his col-
leagues with his managerial and coalition-building skills. After Brown’s re-argu-
ment, the undecided justices are persuaded, one by one, to join Warren’s opinion for
the court. With the vote at 81, Stanley Reed tears up his draft dissent and joins as
well.34 In the end, the court speaks with a single voice, announcing that separate is
unequal after all.
The entire story could be a send-up of Asch. The roomful of nine, acting in
“confederacy” with the southern states, has been declaring shorter lines equal to
longer ones for over fifty years. Now the NAACP has launched a new “trial,” seeking
to overturn the “shorter but equal” doctrine. The case presents grave practical and
theoretical questions. How is it that lines understood to be equal for so long can sud-
denly be deemed unequal? Some empirical evidence shows that, in practice, shorter
lines are unequal to longer ones, but can such contingent data resolve a question of
principle? Do the justices have the institutional competence to overturn the legis-
lature’s determination that shorter lines are equal to longer ones? Should they
declare shorter lines to be per se unequal to longer ones, or should they continue to
determine the matter on a case by case basis? And so on. Accounts of the individual
justices’ decisions to join Warren’s opinion also read a bit like an Asch parody. The
pro-Plessy justices think the case involves a matter of social policy best left to the
states. However, if a majority of their colleagues feels differently, they will not
stand in the way. For the good of the institution, they will join everybody else’s view
that shorter lines are unequal to longer ones. I am being a bit unfair here, and over-
simplifying a complicated story, but I do not think the comparison to the mad logic
of the conformity experiments is unwarranted.
Or look at the proceeding as a rendering of Godot. As the justices struggle with
the question before them, we see  in the scribbled notes that have survived from
their meetings, or in the remarkable memoranda written by Frankfurter and Jack-
son  the same odd blend of courage and fecklessness displayed by Beckett’s protag-
onists, who must know no one is coming to get them out of this fix, but keep looking
for someone (such as Congress) who will.35 Much as they loathe segregation, the
undecided justices are nearly overwhelmed by the temptation to shake their heads
and exhale, nothing to be done. Frankfurter and Jackson, two of the sharpest minds
ever to serve, are at once brilliantly incisive and mealy mouthed, staring unflinch-
ingly into the void yet unable to make a decision. Jackson has to be practically
ordered by his clerk to stop wringing his hands,36 while Frankfurter’s soliloquies on
the anguish of responsibility are virtually cribbed from Beckett. Frankfurter to his
colleagues:
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Only for those who have not the responsibility of decision is it easy
to decide these [school segregation] cases. This is so because they
present a legal issue inextricably bound up with deep feeling on
sharply conflicting social and political issues. The legal issue derives
from the established practice of exercising judicial authority when
appeal is made to vague provisions in the Civil War Amendments.
While it has now been settled beyond question that some of the
guarantees of the Constitution are not judicially enforceable, e.g.,
the guarantee of a republican form of government, amendments to
the Constitution introduced in the reconstruction period, no less
vague and no more appropriate for judicial judgment, serve as the
basis for adjudication. The inevitable result is that issues are cast in
legal form for disposition by this Court that are embroiled in explo-
sive psychological and political attitudes [. . .].37
Vladimir to Estragon:
Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! (Pause. Vehemently.) Let
us do something, while we have the chance! It is not every day that
we are needed. Not indeed that we personally are needed. Others
would meet the case equally well, if not better. To all mankind they
were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our ears! But at
this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we
like it or not. Let us make the most of it, before it is too late! Let us
represent worthily for once the foul brood to which a cruel fate con-
signed us! What to do you say? (Estragon says nothing.) It is true
that when with folded arms we weigh the pros and cons we are no
less a credit to our species. The tiger bounds to the help of his conge-
ners without the least reflexion, or else he slinks away into
the depths of the thickets. But that is not the question. What are we
doing here, that is the question. And we are blessed in this, that
we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one
thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come 38
Then, unexpectedly, a man does come. Could this be the person for whom everyone
has been waiting? That is what his colleagues are inclined to think, after they get
over their initial uncertainty about his identity.39 Godot, it turns out, is none other
than the former governor of California, arrived to cure them of their hesitations
and to write an opinion they can all join.
All of this must sound terribly critical of the court, but it should not. The justices
are not, after all, the only actors in this little drama. We are watching plays within
plays here: on one level the court is performing for the rest of the country, while on
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another the country is performing for itself and for the rest of the world.40 Pressing
the Godot analogy, it is not only the justices who have waited around for someone to
“make us all live up to our hypocrisies,” as Jackson put it.41 If the court is miles
behind where it should be, it is miles ahead of nearly everyone else in power at the
time. (“We are not saints, but we have kept our appointment. How many people can
boast as much?”42) Pressing the Asch analogy, the court might be compared to one
of those brave subjects who, having gone along with all the “confederates” up until
now, look apprehensively around the room, bite the bullet and say what they actu-
ally see. It is a brave act, even if it takes the persistent nudging of the NAACP to
get the court to do it. The precedents are all against it; the framers are silent, or
rather say different things at different times; and the rest of the government is
mostly comfortable with the status quo. The court is all alone here, with no author-
ity figure to tell it what to do or to protect it from the harsh disapproval of all the
confederates in the room.
This is no small predicament. It is all very well for a nonconforming Asch sub-
ject, priding himself on his independence, to simply thumb his nose at everyone
around him, but this is not something the court, ever mindful of the switch in time
that saved nine, can do to the rest of the country. The justices cannot desegregate
the schools, and neither can the lower federal courts, without the cooperation of
coordinate branches at both the state and federal level. Moreover, this is not a semi-
nar room filled with polite college students looking at drawings on a board. The
“confederates” in this experiment are the real thing: just look at the stars-and-bars
flags soon to be hanging over their state capitols. School segregation, in their minds,
is essential to preserving racial purity and the southern way of life, which means
keeping young black males away from young white females, with ropes if necessary.
Fourteen-year-old Emmett Till will shortly be murdered for crossing the color line,
and his killers promptly set free. The justices cannot predict in 1953 the massive
resistance and racial hysteria their decision will produce, which will far exceed
what the southerners among them are warning of, but they know trouble is coming.
Easy as the case must seem from our vantage point, it is not easy from theirs, a
point that my irreverent account is not intended to obscure. On the contrary: the
absurdity of the case lies precisely in the fact that it is so difficult.
How exactly do you “prove” that shorter lines are unequal to longer ones, when
everyone around you is determined to believe otherwise? This is the predicament
created by Plessy’s “separate but equal,” a fiction that has an uncanny resemblance
to Asch’s “shorter but equal,” both in its patent falsity and in the process by which it
is maintained. Its premises  that Jim Crow treats blacks and whites alike, that it
is not a caste system designed to brand some citizens as inferior, that the harm it
causes is purely in the victim’s imagination  requires of its adherents the same
queer suspension of disbelief we see on display in Asch: the determination to ignore
the evidence of one’s senses, the surrender of individual subjectivity to the demands
of mass psychology, the pervasive use of denial and rationalization.43 No one
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actually believes, in the 1940s or 1950s, that separate is equal; no one really
believed it back in the 1890s either. But neither is it true to say that Plessy’s sup-
porters are just lying. Instead they occupy, to all appearances, the same ambiguous
space staked out by the Asch subjects, not quite believing the majority answer but
not quite disbelieving it either, or believing and disbelieving it at the same time,
like the 2 C 2 D 5 people in Orwell’s 1984.44 It makes no difference that the
doctrine’s fraudulence becomes clearer with each passing year: the longer the fiction
is maintained, the more its adherents are motivated to protect their psychic invest-
ments in a principle “so often pronounced, so confidently relied upon, so long contin-
ued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance.”45 In
experimental psychology circles, this process of molding one’s convictions to con-
form to one’s actions will soon be called dissonance reduction.46 In legal circles, it is
called stare decisis.
“The fact would seem to be, if in my situation one may speak of facts,” a Beckett
character says, “that I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak.”47
What do you say to the confederates, by which I mean both the practitioners of sepa-
rate but equal in the south and their enablers everywhere else in the country? In
what language do you say it? Separate but equal cannot be attacked on “legal”
grounds because it is woven into the law, together with the institutional doctrines
that support it  deference to the political branches, state sovereignty, limited fed-
eral power, respect for precedent, and so on. But it cannot be attacked on “factual”
grounds either, because the facts of segregation lie in the domain of “sociology,” not
law. The charge of speaking “sociology” will frequently be leveled at the NAACP and
later the court, whenever either of them raises the subject of the real nature of segre-
gation, or tries to talk about the way it operates in the world rather than in the
fictional universe of the law.48 To watch them caught in this dilemma  trapped
between the corrupted discourse of law and the forbidden discourse of fact  is to
watch individuals wandering through a communicative void, compelled to speak of
things of which they cannot speak, to represent the seemingly unrepresentable. In
the end they have to rely on the dolls.
III
Those damned dolls, William Coleman dubbed them, recalling the battles within
the NAACP legal team over whether to use the experiments that would ultimately
become Exhibit A in the case, both in the plaintiffs’ appellate brief and in the
famous footnote 11 of the court’s Brown opinion. Taken in a slightly different sense
than the one he intended, I think Coleman’s remark goes to the heart of the matter.
As “proof” that separate is unequal, Kenneth and Mamie Clark’s studies of
preschoolers playing with dolls have always had strong detractors, starting with
the dissenting NAACP lawyers who argued that the court would never take such
evidence seriously. As a piece of experimental theater, though, the studies are
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unforgettable, which is no doubt why Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter opted
to give them center stage in the case.49 Here is Kenneth Clark testifying in the trial
court proceedings.
A. I made these tests on Thursday and Friday of this past week at
your request, and I presented it to children in the Scott’s Branch
Elementary school, concentrating particularly on the elementary
group. I used these methods which I told you about  the Negro and
White dolls  which were identical in every respect save skin color.
[. . .] I presented these dolls to them and I asked them the following
questions in the following order: “Show me the doll that you like
best or that you’d like to play with,” “Show me the doll that is the
‘nice’ doll,” “Show me the doll that looks ‘bad,’” and then the follow-
ing questions also: “Give me the doll that looks like a white child,”
“Give me the doll that looks like a colored child,” “Give me the doll
that looks like a Negro child,” and “Give me the doll that looks like
you.”
Q. “Like you?”
A. “Like you.” That was the final question, and you can see why. I
wanted to get the child’s free expression of his opinions and feelings
before I had him identified with one of these two dolls. I found that
of the children between the ages of six and nine whom I tested,
which were a total of sixteen in number, that ten of those children
chose the white doll as their preference; the doll which they liked
best. Ten of them also considered the white doll a “nice” doll. And, I
think you have to keep in mind that these two dolls are absolutely
identical in every respect except skin color. Eleven of these sixteen
children chose the brown doll as the doll which looked “bad.” This is
consistent with previous results which we have obtained testing
over three hundred children [. . .].
Q. Well, as a result of your tests, what conclusions have you
reached, Mr. Clark, with respect to the infant plaintiffs involved in
this case?
A. The conclusion which I was forced to reach was that these chil-
dren in Clarendon County, like other human beings who are sub-
jected to an obviously inferior status in the society in which they
live, have been definitely harmed in the development of their
personalities; that the signs of instability in their personalities are
clear, and I think that every psychologist would accept and inter-
pret these signs as such.
Q. Is that the type of injury which in your opinion would be endur-
ing or lasting?
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A. I think it is the kind of injury which would be as enduring or last-
ing as the situation endured, changing only in its form and in the
way it manifests itself.
Mr. Carter: Thank you. Your witness.50
The methodological objections here are well known: no control groups, insufficient
sample sizes, no statistical analyses; no way of determining the extent to which seg-
regation rather than other factors accounts for the experiments’ results, which are
actually more pronounced in northern states than in southern ones.51 Yet for all
that, the experiments are surely a masterpiece of absurdist drama, as powerful as
anything the genre has produced. Using the usual anti-naturalistic trappings  sol-
itary characters, empty sets, minimal narrative, nonexistent dialogue  it enacts a
kind of nightmare of meaninglessness and dehumanization. Toys and child’s play,
normally signs of pleasure and self-expression, instead signify self-negation and
despair. Without speaking a word (“Show me,” “Hand me,”), humans become inter-
changeable with inanimate objects, and push away the ones they most identify
with. A playwright could scarcely render more vividly the modern world’s version of
damnation  of the destruction, if not of the soul, then of the self.
Dolls in Brown, lines in Asch, hats in Godot. In all three, simple objects are
used to convey the erosion of subjectivity and the evacuation of meaning in a
Figure 2. Kenneth Clark and a Young Subject, 1947
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world in which language, like Lucky, has reached the end of its tether. In Asch,
the universe has been reduced to black lines on a white background, the English
language is down to a primitive vocabulary of just three letters. Even these
elementary signs quickly become unreliable, as everyone says A or B when
the correct answer is C. Nothing is certain, discussion is impossible, and the
subjects are induced to surrender their very subjectivity. They come to resemble
the lines themselves, stretching or contracting as the experiment shows the next
card, producing “the identity of subject and object in a state of complete
alienation.”52
In Godot the landscape contains only a few pathetic knickknacks, mostly ill-fit-
ting clothing and smelly, worn-out shoes, which form the lifeworld of characters
who are unsure whether to keep them or throw them away. They complement the
half-buried allusions to a ruined European culture, itself now buried beneath ashes
of war and mass murder.53 Words being complicit in the crime, it is only discarded
objects that can bear witness to a century of unspeakable atrocity.54
ESTRAGON: In the meantime let us try and converse calmly, since
we are incapable of keeping silent.
VLADIMIR: You’re right, we’re inexhaustible.
ESTRAGON: It’s so we won’t think.
VLADIMIR: We have that excuse.
ESTRAGON: It’s so we won’t hear.
VLADIMIR: We have our reasons.
ESTRAGON: All the dead voices.
VLADIMIR: They make a noise like wings.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
VLADIMIR: Like sand.
ESTRAGON: Like leaves.
Silence.
VLADIMIR: They speak all at once.
ESTRAGON: Each one to itself.
VLADIMIR: Rather they whisper.
ESTRAGON: They rustle.
VLADIMIR: They murmur.
ESTRAGON: They rustle.
Silence.
VLADIMIR: What do they say?
ESTRAGON: They talk about their lives.
VLADIMIR: To have lived is not enough for them.
ESTRAGON: They have to talk about it.
VLADIMIR: To be dead is not enough for them.
ESTRAGON: It is not sufficient.
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Enslaved Lucky cannot speak except when he wears his hat, which for that reason
the others are careful to keep from him. Midway through his famous monologue on
the sufferings of those who “for reasons unknown are plunged in torment,” his hat
is taken and stomped on, rendering him silent for the duration. His master Pozzo
will do the talking for him. He is not spared, in Maurice Blanchot’s formulation,
“the worst degradation, that of losing the power to say I.”55
Part of the pathos of the doll experiments is their resistance to interpretation,
their inability to speak clearly on the matter at issue in Brown.What are they say-
ing, these children who need dolls with which to speak, who have lost the power to
say I? To the Clarks, whose interpretation was advanced by the plaintiffs and
accepted by the court, they were saying that segregation had filled them with a
sense of inferiority. To the Brown defendants, they were saying precisely the
opposite: the experimental results were most pronounced in the northern states;
did this not suggest that black children were actually better off in segregated
southern classrooms, where they were not placed side by side with pupils to whom
they considered themselves inferior?56 Twisted as the defendants’ position is, it is
perfectly logical, and the experiments themselves provide no basis for choosing
between it and the contrary interpretation. As critics never tired of pointing out,
the Clark studies give no clear signal about segregation as such, because they do
not disentangle it from other possible causes of the subjects’ behavior, from the
myriad reasons they might view themselves as less than equal to white children.
Segregation may be one of those reasons, but that is precisely the question to
which the experiments fail to answer. And so on the crucial issue, the one on
which they have been called to testify, the doll children are unable to make
themselves heard or understood. They suffer for reasons unknown. Rather than
“proving” separate is unequal, the Clark experiments only seem to confirm the
sense that such proof is impossible, in any language the law is able to comprehend.
Like Russian dolls or Chinese boxes, the experiments are a further iteration of the
communicative void at the heart of the case, each door opening to another
identical door. The dolls are silent, the children are silent, and ultimately the
experiments are silent.
As, in the end, is the Brown opinion that embeds them. Written, in the words of
its author, to “be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional
and, above all, non-accusatory,” the opinion is a document of compromise, as the
historians have shown, designed to win over both the doubting justices and such
parts of the country as are willing to listen. I am not aware of evidence that the
Chief Justice, or anyone else on the court, was actually influenced by the Clark
studies or the other “sociological” material referred to in the opinion’s famous foot-
note 11, cited as discrediting the Plessy opinion’s view that the harms of segrega-
tion are purely imaginary. Yet whatever its author’s thoughts or intentions were,
the opinion is suffused with the same mood of silent renunciation as the doll
experiments, a “wordless thing in an empty space.”57 Notoriously, it is a virtual
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burlesque of traditional legal reasoning, barely going through the motions of dis-
cussing cases and other conventional sources of constitutional law, bits of which
are strewn about in the opinion like so many tattered articles of worthless clothing.
The body of social science material is compressed into a single paragraph and put
in the margin, as if in mock deference to the law’s tradition of keeping its texts free
of material that might puncture the separate but equal fiction. Buried in footnote
11, the doll experiments become a sort of set piece, almost a mise-en-ab^ıme sum-
ming up the opinion as a whole, much as Lucky’s actions in Godot  the meaning-
less tasks he is given, the performances he is ordered to put on, his interrupted
monologue about senseless suffering  capture the larger work that contains
them. As the children reject the doll that looks like them, the Brown opinion
pushes away the objects made in the court’s image, which means not just the
Plessy fraud but the whole apparatus of constitutional law that made it possible. If
the opinion is “non-rhetorical, unemotional, and, above all, non-accusatory,” it is
so in the same way Godot is, its indictment of an entire culture refracted through
its vaudeville surface.
Warren’s opinion, like Beckett’s work, frustrated many observers with its terse-
ness, its refusal to explain itself, a condition neither writer was inclined to remedy.
Beckett was forever reticent about the play’s meaning and the title character’s iden-
tity (“If I knew, I would have said so in the play”), dismissing attempts to interpret
the work as an allegory of some kind, insisting that the resemblance between the
words Godot and God was accidental.58 So far as I know he never said much more
than what he told in a much-quoted 1956 letter to critic Harold Hobson, who had
championed the play in London after early negative reviews almost shut down the
production.
I take no sides. I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not
believe in them. There is a wonderful sentence in Augustine. I wish
I could remember the Latin. It is even finer in Latin than in English.
“Do not despair, one of the thieves was saved. Do not presume, one
of the thieves was damned.” That sentence has a wonderful shape.
It is the shape that matters.”59
The thieves again: associated, as I suggested before, with the dangers of going
along with the crowd, here the story is associated with purity of language. Warren
and his colleagues, of course, being in a very different line of work, would never
have assigned the same priority to matters of aesthetic form. Yet neither he nor
anyone else on the court ever felt obliged to supply a rationale for overruling
Plessy, beyond what was said in Brown itself: future decisions banning segregation
in places other than schools would take the form of one-sentence per curiam opin-
ions, with no explanation provided at all. As in Beckett, the refusal to conform is
tied to economy of expression, to the refusal of degraded means of communication.
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This, it seems to me, is one way of understanding the decision to give the last word
to the damned dolls.
IV
While it was clearly a big turning point, the Brown decision did not mark the end of
the national conformity experiment of which it was a part. The court’s opinion did
not succeed in “proving” the shorter but equal confederates wrong, at least in their
eyes. On the contrary, it only induced them to reveal their true colors, as several
states changed their flags to include the Stars and Bars of the old confederacy. The
“massive resistance” to desegregation in the south involved widespread repression
of dissent, eventually forcing the court to issue a series of First Amendment deci-
sions in the late 1950s and early 1960s.60 Political moderates were voted out of office
or changed their tune; investigative machinery was created to identify members of
the NAACP; individuals, white or black, who spoke in favor of integration lost their
jobs, received death threats, were firebombed out of their homes; television stations
refused to air national programs discussing integration. “[T]he South has room for
only one viewpoint,” an Alabama legislator announced, advocating the purging of
libraries. Ostracized as traitors, the lower court federal judges charged with imple-
menting Brown were aptly described at the time as Fifty-Eight Lonely Men.61
The Godot performance continued as well. If Brown encouraged anyone to think
that the savior had arrived at last, wearing a black robe, the illusion was punctured
the following year when the court took up the question of remedy in the Brown II
opinion, issued in May 1955. The “all deliberate speed” formula, which Warren got
from Frankfurter, made the court look a lot like the well-meaning little boy who
announces that Mr. Godot will not be coming today, but may perhaps come tomor-
row. The Montgomery bus boycott commenced a few months afterward, led by a
young minister whose position, in essence, was: time to stop waiting, because no
one is coming. A few years later, with the civil rights movement in full swing and
Beckett’s play a worldwide sensation, explicit connections would be drawn between
them. Godot was a staple of the Free Southern Theater, a touring group formed by
civil rights activists in 1963, whose performances before predominantly black audi-
ences in the deep south  part theater, part community organizing  were closely
monitored by the White Citizens Councils and the police, and often interrupted by
violence.62 Before the performances, the director would tell the audience members
that they were the real performers, a “statement that occasionally was taken liter-
ally when a spectator would step up onto the stage.”63 Lucky, played by a black
actor, would appear with a rope around his neck held by Pozzo, played by a white
actor, an image that made the performance’s political significance hard to miss.64
When Vladimir and Estragon spoke of waiting for the title character, members of
the audience would chime in, “We’re not waiting!”  a sentiment echoed by the bus
boycott leader in his manifesto:Why We Can’t Wait.65
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